Why Syria Won’t Help President Obama Earn His Nobel Prize

BARIN KAYAOĞLU

13 May 2013

Obama’s Nobel

I remember having mixed reactions back in 2009 when President Barack Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. On the one hand, just like many people in the United States and around the world, I was excited about his presidency. He looked, spoke, and acted differently than his predecessor, George W. Bush.

On the other hand, I knew how past presidents had earned the famed peace award. Theodore Roosevelt won it in 1906 for brokering peace between Russia and Japan. Thirteen years later, Woodrow Wilson became a Nobel laureate for ending World War I. Jimmy Carter was given the award in 2002 not only because of his global human rights advocacy after leaving the Oval Office, but also because of his indispensable role in the Camp David Accords that secured peace between Israel and Egypt in 1978.

I was worried that the immense weight of the Nobel would raise expectations so high that – much like a child prodigy cracking under pressure and failing to reach his full potential – Mr. Obama would not be able to accomplish a great deal on the international scene.

To be sure, the American president has had impressive foreign policy accomplishments. He successfully guided the new nuclear arms reduction treaty (new START) with Russia through what could’ve been an impossible Senate ratification. His cautious approach to the Libyan Revolution in 2011 and his reluctance to go to war with Iran for its controversial nuclear program are also commendable. But the recipient of a Nobel Peace Prize should earn the award by averting a major war or alleviating massive suffering, especially if he or she happens to be a current president of the United States.

Obama’s Allies and Adversaries in Syria

I was hoping that Syria would give Mr. Obama that opportunity but I don’t think that’s going to happen. The last time I wrote about Syria fifteen months ago, I had ended on a pessimistic (and somewhat banal) note: “Half-hearted political talk will certainly not solve Syria’s tragedy. But determined action may not be the answer either.” 70,000 dead Syrians later, I’m sorry to see that I have yet to be corrected.

The problem facing the President is that two of America’s Middle Eastern allies which are most involved in the Syrian crisis – namely, Turkey and Qatar – are pursuing policies that undermine U.S. interests. While Washington hopes to end the conflict on a negotiated settlement – the guns fall silent, an interim government takes over, and the Syrian people decide their future in free and fair elections – Ankara and Doha arm Sunni extremists, most notably Al-Nusra Front, which recently announced its allegiance to Al-Qaeda, the group that carried out the attacks of September 11, 2001. Al-Nusra is busy replacing the Free Syrian Army as the main insurgent group in Syria.

Although last week’s agreement between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to convene a conference with the representatives of the Syrian opposition and the government of President Bashar Assad is a step in the right direction, unfortunately, it may be too little too late. While Turkey and Qatar support the likes of al-Nusra, Saudi Arabia and Jordan are also supplying Syrian insurgents. With Russian and Iranian backing, however, the Assad regime is holding fast and creating a deadlock: the Syrian president cannot crush the insurgents nor can they overthrow him. To paraphrase Churchill’s maxim about Russia, Syria is now a revolution wrapped in a civil war inside a Middle East-wide power struggle.

Not even Mr. Obama’s good relations with the Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, can help the United States to break the Syrian knot. The two leaders are scheduled to meet in Washington on 16 May. Even if the American president makes a convincing case that Turkish support for Sunni insurgents is making the war in Syria bloodier, longer, and harder to end, it may not have an effect. In the aftermath of the car bombings in the Turkish town of Reyhanlı on the Syrian border two days ago, Mr. Erdoğan maintained his combative and defiant tone; he is not the type to admit mistakes and change course.

It would have been great for the United States if Mr. Erdoğan had the power to topple the Assad regime singlehandedly. The problem is that neither Turkey nor any of Washington’s regional allies – except perhaps Israel – would be able to pull off a military operation against Assad without U.S. support. After the Syrian military shot down a Turkish jetfighter last year, civilian and military leaders in Ankara realized the immense costs of the fight for Syria. The allegations of the use of chemical weapons sobered them once again. The Jordanians, Saudis, or Qataris would also be very hesitant to engage Assad head-on for similar reasons. As for the Israelis, despite their capabilities, it would be foolish of them to hand a golden opportunity to Damascus and Tehran to make the case that the uprisings in Syria are part of a “Zionist plot.”

The American president is wise to be pensive.

The American president is wise to be pensive.

“Birds in the Sky” without “Boots on the Ground”?

Mr. Obama has signaled his refusal to commit “boots on the ground” in Syria repeatedly. But he is coming under immense pressure to change course. In late 2012, the Obama administration had threatened the Assad regime that, the use of chemical weapons against the insurgents constituted a “red line.” Crossing that line, Washington said, would result in U.S. military action. Now, Senator John McCain, the president’s opponent in the 2008 election and an adamant advocate of U.S. humanitarian interventions, is taking the president to task after reports that chemical weapons were indeed used in Syria. Mr. McCain wonders if the Obama “red line” was written on “disappearing ink.”

Likewise, Vali Nasr, a renowned Middle East expert and State Department adviser in the first Obama administration, pointed out how, if Syria were to become another Somalia in the heart of the Middle East, it would seriously hurt U.S. interests and regional security. The proponents of using U.S. airpower against the Assad regime argue that it could bring the Syrian civil war to a swift and less bloody conclusion.

Indeed, American “birds in the sky” may prevent the need for “boots on the ground.” Or, American birds could very well be combined with Turkish, Saudi, Qatari, and Jordanian boots on the ground. Unfortunately, even then a resolution to the Syrian conflict may not come, especially if Iranian and Lebanese Shia boots respond in kind.

The irony with the current deadlock in Syria is that, if Mr. Obama wants to resolve it on America’s terms, he would have to act like his maligned predecessor and go it alone (or preferably with “a coalition of the willing”). In fact, unlike Mr. Bush in Iraq in 2002-03, Mr. Obama may actually find many eager regional partners to topple Bashar Assad. Yet, it’s highly unlikely that the American people and their president will walk down that road – unless, of course, Mr. Obama decides to return his Nobel Prize.

Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. candidate in history at the University of Virginia and a predoctoral fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University. He welcomes all comments, questions, and exchanges. To contact him, click here.

You can also follow him on Twitter (@barinkayaoglu) and Facebook (BarınKayaoğlu.com).

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Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: The Third Way in Iranian Politics? (Repost)

BARIN KAYAOĞLU

Originally posted on 15 March 2011

He is seen as “unstable,” “ultra-conservative,” and “fanatical” by many Westerners. Five years ago, the Sunday Times Magazine had called him the “Apostle of the Apocalypse.” And he has done much to contribute to that image with his offensive remarks about Israel and the Holocaust.

His domestic woes are numerous as well: He faces a bloodied but nevertheless powerful reformist camp that demands economic, social, and political liberalization. The hardliners, on the other hand, struggle to keep things exactly as they are in the Islamic Republic. Meanwhile, according to a leading expert, the prospects of Iranian economy look “bleak.”

In this context, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seems to be recasting himself as the “third way” in Iranian politics; a pragmatist. In fact, since his disputed re-election in June 2009, Mr. Ahmadinejad has done much to underscore his pragmatic side.

For example, rumor has it that he tried to reach an accommodation with the opposition amid the post-election protests in June 2009. And, according to some Wikileaks documents, he may have paid a personally high price for it.

Recently, Mr. Ahmadinejad took the unpopular – but quite necessary – decision to lift government subsidies on gasoline, electricity, and foodstuffs to divert the funds to infrastructural projects.

Also a testament to his pragmatism, Mr. Ahmadinejad still negotiates with the international community over his country’s controversial nuclear program.

Of course, the President of Iran also shows his socially conservative side from time to time. For example, four months ago, he called for Iranians girls to marry at the age of 16.

But the evidence for Mr. Ahmadinejad’s pragmatism is becoming too great to ignore – especially if we look at his closest political partner, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei. In July 2009, Mr. Ahmadinejad appointed Mr. Mashaei, a former political advisor and his son’s father-in-law, to the post of first vice president. This was a very important move because Mr. Mashaei, also a pragmatist, is pretty much hated by the hardliners – the folks deemed close to Mr. Ahmadinejad.

Many reasons exist for Mr. Mashaei’s hard time with the hardliners: In 2007, he attended a ceremony in Turkey, where women performed a traditional dance (public female dancing and singing is still forbidden in Iran). Then, in a shocking episode in 2009, Mr. Mashaei pointed out that Iran’s problems were with the Israeli government and not the people of Israel, whom he considered “Iran’s friend.” In the Iranian context, that comment has extremely pro-Israel overtones but Mr. Ahmadinejad never chastised his subordinate.

Thus, no surprise that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei struck down Mr. Mashaei’s appointment as first vice president in July 2009. But a defiant Ahmadinejad stuck to his guns and asked his first vice president to stay on board as chief of staff.

That was hardly the end of it: In August 2010, Mr. Mashaei made extremely nationalistic remarks to a group of Iranian expatriates: Iranian culture, according to Mr. Mashaei, had saved Islam from “Arab parochialism” after the Islamic conquest of Persia in the late 7th century. Mr. Mashaei’s words were so out of line with the hardliners that even Ayatollah Mohammed-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, Mr. Ahmadinejad’s “spiritual mentor,” condemned them. Another hardline cleric berated Mr. Mashaei for his “pagan nationalism.”

Now, the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei duo is preparing to host Iranian New Year (Now Ruz) ceremonies in Persepolis, which disturbs the hardliners for its subtle emphasis on the country’s pre-Islamic past. Rumors in Iran have it that dozens of heads of state and government will attend the festivities, a party that Mr. Ahmadinejad’s reformist predecessor Mohammed Khatami could have only dreamed of hosting.

(Ahmadinejad and Mashaei: Can the Dynamic Duo Prevail Over Both the Hardliners and the Reformists? – Photo courtesy of Corbis)

To be sure, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is hardly the radical reformer that Iran badly needs or the bold bridge-builder that the West desperately wants. If anything, his boldness on Israel and the nuclear standoff has worked against Iran as well as the West. More important, profound tensions exist between the Iranian people’s desires and their country’s political and economic realities. Down the road, those tensions may become too insurmountable for a pragmatist to resolve.

Nevertheless, it would not be too foolish to expect a few more surprises – pleasant as well as unpleasant – from Iran’s controversial president before the end of his term in 2013.

Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. candidate in history at the University of Virginia and a predoctoral fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University. He welcomes all comments, questions, and exchanges. To contact him, click here.

You can also follow him on Twitter (@barinkayaoglu) and Facebook (BarınKayaoğlu.com).

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After Boston: The Good, the Bad, the Disturbing

BARIN KAYAOĞLU

24 April 2013

Last week on Monday, 15 April, two explosions at the Boston Marathon killed three people (including an 8-year-old boy) and injured more than 250. On 18 April, Thursday, the suspected bombers shot a police officer and wounded another. The police killed one of the suspects. The other one was apprehended on Friday night.

The attacks in Boston showed the good, the bad, and the disturbing sides of post-9/11 America. Especially the bad and the disturbing bits offer useful lessons.

The Good

The marathon runners and the people of Boston: many individuals rushed to the scene of the bombings on Monday to help the injured. And so many Bostonians donated blood that the American Red Cross had to turn away new donors because there was enough blood for the victims.

The calmness of political leaders and law enforcement agencies: from President Barack Obama to Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick and from Speaker of the House John Boehner to Boston Mayor Thomas Menino, political leaders kept their cool and convinced people that they had things under control.

Law enforcement agencies – federal, state, and local – also did their job well. Although it took three full days to identify the suspects, that was better than catching the wrong people and letting the culprits escape.

The Bad

The media circus: on 17 April, CNN reported that police sources had told the network that one of the suspects, “a dark-skinned male,” was in custody. Not only was the tip false, it was completely fabricated. A senior CNN anchor blamed “part of the mistake” on the authorities – an excuse worse than the infraction. The comedian Jon Stewart was hardly being unfair when he called CNN the “human centipede of news.” (If you don’t get that reference, click here.)

Law enforcement agencies’ and political leaders’ overreaction: after the shootings on Thursday night, law enforcement agencies – with several thousand officers – conducted a manhunt around Boston. The entire area was virtually locked down to find a single suspect who, it turned out, was hiding in a boat all along. It’s not easy to see things clearly in the fog of war. But shutting down a metropolitan area of 4.5 million people to catch a 19-year-old seemed a little exaggerated.

The problem with this overreaction negatively affected the public in nearby cities as well. I live in New Haven, Connecticut, and the streets of Elm City looked semi-abandoned for much of Friday afternoon. Especially the Yale campus looked like a ghost town.

The Disturbing

The likes of Erik Rush, run-of-the-mill Islamophobes, and the countless idiots who harassed people because they “look terrorist”: Immediately after the Monday bombing, Fox News commentator Erik Rush posted a tweet to solve the problem of terrorism: “Let’s kill all Muslims.” When people criticized those outrageous words, Mr. Rush defended his “sarcasm” and called one of his detractors an “idiot.”

The level of intelligence (!) displayed in Mr. Rush’s “sarcasm” and CNN’s “reporting” was part of a bigger problem. A student from Saudi Arabia, who was seen fleeing the scene of the bombings (because who runs away from an explosion?), was first declared a “suspect,” then “a person of interest,” and finally, a “witness.” Others cast suspicious glances on Sunil Tripathi, a 22-year-old Indian American man, who’s been gone missing since mid-March. Cause for suspicion? He wore t-shirts depicting the revolutionary Che Guevara. (Never mind that Guevara, a communist, has become one of the greatest capitalist icons of all times.)

The Future

Benjamin Franklin had warned how people who sacrifice liberty for security deserve neither. I always thought we didn’t quite make that trade-off after 9/11. The Friday lockdown in Boston, however, showed how we still haven’t learned the proper response to terrorism.

A good place to start would be to re-think the “no-fly” and “terrorist-watch” lists with hundreds of thousands of names. Law enforcement agencies have to find better ways of finding people who deserve to be on those lists. Russian security services allegedly warned the FBI about one of the Boston suspects but he never got on any “watch list.” If these lists become so full that we can’t manage them, we will have a hard time catching the real threats to public safety.

We also need to find better ways to help immigrants to integrate to American society (one of the suspects allegedly once said “I don’t have a single American, I don’t understand them”). We also need to do something about the ease with which people get firearms in this country.

But we also need to understand that there will always be deranged individuals – immigrant or native – who will find a way to hurt the innocent – with or without a gun. Therefore, in situations like these, we need to learn to keep our cool. If we lose our heads, compromise on our values, and display fear and hatred rather than calm and love toward our fellow humans, our next experience with a Boston-like attack is going to be worse and even more disturbing.

Boston Bombing

Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. candidate in history at the University of Virginia and a predoctoral fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University. He welcomes all comments, questions, and exchanges. To contact him, click here.

You can also follow him on Twitter (@barinkayaoglu) and Facebook (BarınKayaoğlu.com).

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Is Turkey Really Ready For Peace?

BARIN KAYAOĞLU

5 April 2013

[Yazının Türkçesi için buraya tıklayın]

What word that belongs to yesterday
Is gone, my dear, with yesterday
The time to say new things is today
Rumi

In my previous post, I had explained why I was pessimistic about Turkey despite the positive aura borne out of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s Nowruz message. In a nutshell, I argued that given Öcalan’s and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s past statements and actions praising violence, a tough path awaited Turkey.

Another reason why I’m pessimistic is because even though a majority of Turkey’s citizens want violence to end, I don’t think they’re ready to face the requirements of a resolution, a real peace.

Before going into the resolution, it’s useful to diagnose the problem.

The problem is violence itself. For 30 years, handing Kalashnikov rifles over to Kurdish kids to fight G-3-holding Turkish kids has neither improved the lot of Turkish Kurds nor eliminated the risk seccesion for Turkey. On the contrary, violence bred a vicious circle: every dead militant, soldier, policeman, or civilian alienated Turks and Kurds from each other. Every death flamed more hatred among those left behind.

As such, the first thing to do is to end violence, to put down the guns. This truthism, however, brings us to a point that PKK sympathizers will not like: it is the PKK that has to cease its activities, not the state. It is also the PKK that has to lay down its guns, not the state. After all, states throughout the world have to maintain national security and public order irrespective of whether they are dealing with militant groups or not. Thus, PKK has to go beyond its peaceful Nowruz rhetoric and actually renounce violence.

In order to persuade PKK militants to give up on violence, the Turkish state and the AKP government have a very important duty. I’m not talking about another law for “amnesty, regret, returning home,” half-hearted measures from the 1990s and early 2000s that failed to stop the bloodshed. Nor am I talking about the so-called “wise men committee” that was recently announced. What Turkey needs is a mechanism similar to South Africa’s post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

This commission should comprise experts on conflict analysis and resolution (not just flashy names that would make the public feel good) and should be responsible with listening to the testimonies of PKK members and record their statements. More important, when feasible, the commission should find a way to bring PKK militants together with the victims of their attacks or their surviving family members. That way, the commission would give perpetrators and victims a change to apologize and forgive.

Turkey’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission would not only handle the cases of PKK militants but also government agents who committed crimes (especially those involved in extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, and torture) during operations against the militant group. Just as in the case of militants, these agents would also be encouraged to meet with their victims or their surviving kin for mutual apology and forgiveness.

I am aware that many people would find this idea of a commission unacceptable and that it would not bring back the dead. I am not naive and certainly not stupid. At the beginning of this post, I expressly pointed out the possibility that few people in Turkey would accept this idea.

But if we don’t want the 40 thousand people we’ve lost in the last 30 years to turn into 400 thousand or 4 million in the next three decades, we all need to draw lessons from our mistakes. Only if we can forgive ourselves and “the others” can real peace come to Turkey.

Are we ready to forgive ourselves? I’m not sure about that.

Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. candidate in history at The University of Virginia. He welcomes all comments, questions, and exchanges. To contact him, click here.

You can also follow him on Twitter (@barinkayaoglu) and Facebook (BarınKayaoğlu.com).

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Türkiye Gerçekten Barışa Hazır Mı?

BARIN KAYAOĞLU

5 Nisan 2013

[For the English version, click here]

Dünle beraber gitti cancağızım
Ne kadar söz varsa düne ait
Şimdi yeni şeyler söylemek lazım
Mevlana

Son yazımda PKK lideri Abdullah Öcalan’ın Nevruz mesajı sonrasında oluşan olumlu havaya rağmen neden kötümser olduğumu anlatmıştım. Yazının özeti şuydu: Öcalan’ın ve Başbakan Erdoğan’ın geçmişte şiddeti öven sözleri ve hareketleri göz önüne alındığında, Türkiye’yi tahmin edilenden çok daha zorlu bir süreç bekliyor.

Kötümser olmamın bir diğer sebebi de Türkiye’de vatandaşların çoğunun şiddetin sona ermesini istemesine rağmen çözüme – yani gerçek barışın tesisi için gerekli olanlara – hazır olmadıklarını düşünmem.

Çözümü tartışmadan önce sorunun ne olduğunu kısaca ortaya koymakta yarar var.

Sorun şiddetin kendisi. Bir grup çocuğun eline Kalaşnikov verip G-3 tutan çocuklarla çarpıştırmak son 30 yılda ne Kürtlerin koşullarını iyileştirdi, ne de Türkiye’nin bölünme riskini azalttı. Tam tersine, şiddet ortamı fasit bir daire yarattı: ölen her militan, asker, polis ve sivil, Türkleri ve Kürtleri “ötekileştirdi.” Her ölüm, geride kalanların nefretini körüklendi.

Bu yüzden ilk yapılması gereken şey şiddeti son erdirmek, silahları susturmak. Bu da bizi PKK’ya sempati duyanların hoşuna gitmeyeceği noktaya getiriyor: eylemlerini sona erdirmesi gereken taraf devlet değil, PKK. Silah bırakması gereken taraf yine devlet değil, örgüt. Zira her ülkede olduğu gibi Türkiye’de de – militan örgütler var olsa da olmasa da – devletin kolluk kuvvetleri ulusal güvenliği ve asayişi sağlamakla yükümlüler. Dolayısıyla, PKK’nın Nevruz’da söylenenlerin de ötesine geçerek şiddeti tamamen reddettiğini açıklaması gerekiyor.

Örgüt üyelerinin şiddetten vazgeçmeleri için devletin ve AKP hükümetinin üzerine düşen çok önemli bir görev var. Bu da Meclis’ten “af, pişmanlık, eve dönüş, vs.” kanunu çıkarmak ya da “akiller” grubu oluşturmak değil. Gerekli olan, Güney Afrika’da ırk ayrımı (apartheid) sona erdikten sonra kurulan Gerçek ve Uzlaşma Komisyonu (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) gibi bir mekanizmanın oluşturulması.

“Flaş” isimlerden değil, çatışma analizi ve çözümü alanlarında uzmanlaşmış kişilerden oluşacak komisyonun görevi şu çerçeve mantık içinde yürümeli: şiddet eylemlerine katılmış PKK üyelerini dinlemek ve söylediklerini kayda almak ve daha önemlisi, koşullar elverdiğinde örgüt üyelerini eylemlerinin kurbanlarıyla ve aileleriyle yüzleşmelerini sağlamak. Komisyon, bu sayede eylemcilerin kurbanlarından ve ailelerinden özür dilemelerini teşvik edecek bir “affetme-af edilme” dinamiği yaratır.

“Gerçek ve uzlaşma” komisyonu sadece örgüt militanlarının değil, PKK’yla mücadele sırasında yargısız infaz, adam kaçırma ve işkence gibi gayrikanuni eylemlere karışmış devlet görevlilerini de kapsamalı. Ve tıpkı PKK militanları gibi bu kişilerin de uygun olduğunda eylemlerinin kurbanlarıyla ve aileleriyle yüzleşmelerini sağlayarak karşılıklı bir af dileme ve affetme hali yaratılmalı.

Bu komisyon fikrinin birçok insan için kabul edilemez olduğunun ve yitirdiğimiz canları geri getirmeyeceğini gayet iyi biliyorum. Saftirik değilim, aptal hiç değil. Bu öneriyi Türkiye’de çok az insanın kabul edeceğini yazımın başında söylemiştim.

Fakat son 30 yılda yitirdiğimiz 40 bin insanın sonraki 30 yılda 400 bine veya 4 milyona çıkmasını istemiyorsak yaptığımız hatalardan hepimizin ders çıkarması gerekiyor. Ancak kendimizi ve “ötekini” affedebilirsek Türkiye’ye gerçek anlamda barış gelebilir.

Peki kendimizi affetmeye hazır mıyız? İşte bundan emin değilim.

Barın Kayaoğlu, Virginia Üniversitesi Tarih Bölümü’nde doktora adayıdır ve her türlü yoruma, soruya ve fikir alışverişine açıktır. Kendisiyle bağlantıya geçmek için buraya tıklayın.

Ayrıca kendisini Twitter’dan (@barinkayaoglu) ve Facebook’tan (BarınKayaoğlu.com) da takip edebilirsiniz.

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