Tag Archives: Iraq

Egypt’s Coup: In Order to Save Democracy, They Had to Destroy It

BARIN KAYAOĞLU

5 July 2013

The title sums up Egypt’s predicament. The country’s young democracy, like its counterparts elsewhere, had gotten off to a rocky start. A new constitution, formed by a Salafi- and Muslim Brotherhood-dominated assembly, alienated the country’s women, Christian minorities, and progressive youth. President Mohammad Morsi, who had been elected with barely 51 percent of the votes in last year’s elections, took his rule as a mandate to do whatever he wanted. Mr. Morsi turned to authoritarian methods to push his religious agenda. Economic conditions deteriorated, mass protests broke out.

Last Monday, 1 July, Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, General Abdul Fatah al-Sisi, issued a statement warning the opposition and President Morsi to resolve their differences. When the political actors failed, General Sisi moved his forces, removed Mr. Morsi from office, and installed Adly Mansour, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as interim president.

The coup reflected the textbook logic of any military takeover in an unstable democracy: in order to save democracy, the Egyptian military had to destroy it.

What happens now? Unfortunately, neither Egypt’s own history nor examples from other Middle Eastern countries are reassuring. Egypt had experienced a coup in 1952. The coup’s strongman, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, promised to lead the country to development and democracy. Soon, however, Nasser decided that he could not bring both wealth and democracy to his land so he forsake the latter to achieve the former (with immense popular support, it must be said). Anwar Sadat, who succeeded Nasser in 1970, was much less committed to Nasser’s socialism. Nevertheless, he held on to Nasser-like authoritarianism. Mobarak, a very different man than both Nasser and Sadat, also ran his country in an autocratic fashion.

The act of voting hasn't turned Egypt's dreams of democracy into a reality.
The act of voting hasn’t turned Egypt’s dreams of democracy into a reality.

Other Middle Eastern countries shared a similar fate. Turkey had four coups in the second half of the twentieth century (and almost had another one in 2007-8). Last month’s mass protests revealed how Turkish democracy is still an incomplete project. The 1970 coup in Syria brought the Assad dynasty to power. Iraq’s multiple coups from 1958 through the late 1960s enabled the rise of Saddam Hussein.

The greatest problem with coups is that they weaken the institutions – especially a free media and parliament – that could balance acrimonies among different segments of society. Egypt is already witnessing this dangerous dynamic. Conspiracy theories are afoot: the Muslim Brotherhood claims that the interim president, Adly Mansour, is secretly Jewish while Mr. Morsi’s supporters are digging in for a long fight.

Now, Egypt’s military faces an enormous task: it has to draft a constitution and build the political institutions that would balance the demands and expectations of all Egyptians – be they Muslim, Christian, secular, male, female, traditional, or Western-oriented. Otherwise, in a few years it could easily find itself in a position where it would have to save democracy by destroying it again.

Barın Kayaoğlu, a Smith Richardson Foundation fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University, is finishing his Ph.D. in history at the University of Virginia. He welcomes all comments, questions, and exchanges. To contact him, click here.

You can also follow him on Twitter (@barinkayaoglu), and Facebook (BarınKayaoğlu.com).

Share

A U.S.-Iran War: Sure, Why Not?

By BARIN KAYAOĞLU

17 January 2012

The more things change, the more they stay the same.

U.S. and Israeli officials are claiming that Iranian leaders’ increasingly bellicose rhetoric is an indication that the sanctions are working. Some argue that Tehran is now feeling the effects of the sanctions. Soon, it will compromise on the nuclear issue.

Never mind that all the talk about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and then using them against Israel and the West is almost identical to the justification for the Iraq War ten years ago.

And never mind that, just like Iraq, the sanctions against Iran were meant to prevent another war in the Middle East.

But who knows, maybe a war between the United States and Iran won’t be such a bad thing. Here’s why:

–          Crude oil prices will not skyrocket. The world economy will not collapse.

–          There won’t be any nonsense about “rallying around the flag” in Iran. Iranians won’t support their unpopular government just because their country’s being bombed.

–          In fact, it is very likely that the reformists in Iran will gain new ground because the government won’t be able to respond to domestic and international pressure at the same time.

–          The war might even help to start another revolution in Iran.

–          With regime change and their country looking more peaceful than ever (just like Iraq!), Iranians will be grateful to the United States and the international community so much so that they will award lucrative oil and natural gas contracts to American and European companies.

–          There won’t be new insurgent groups springing up in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Muslim world because Muslims won’t be angry over another Western war against a Muslim nation.

And if you agree with any of the above, you should read about the world a little more.

Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. candidate in history at The University of Virginia. He welcomes all comments, questions, and exchanges. To contact him, click here.

You can also follow him on Twitter (@barinkayaoglu) and Facebook (BarınKayaoğlu.com).

Share

The Protests in Tunisia and Egypt and the Future of Democracy in the Middle East

By BARIN KAYAOĞLU

January 31, 2011

The recent protests in Tunisia and Egypt demonstrate this simple truth: Authoritarian governments that promise socioeconomic development at the expense of democracy become neither developed nor democratic. Some observers (especially former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew) point to Taiwan, China, South Korea, and Singapore as successful cases where prioritizing political stability over freedom for the sake of economic growth has worked. But this approach also overlooks closed regimes’ structural problems such as waste, corruption, and poor decision-making in the absence of an effective opposition. For every Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore (which are reasonably democratic today and continue to grow economically), one can point to authoritarian countries that are still underdeveloped: Myanmar, Pakistan, and yes, Tunisia and Egypt.

In the absence of democracy, social turmoil can reverse authoritarian governments’ economic gains. When avenues to express legitimate grievances are closed off (especially free elections), citizens tend to express their anger more violently than they would in a democracy. Furthermore, restricting the opposition actually works against decision-makers in developing countries because it isolates them from much needed feedback, which could lead them to make poor decisions. Thus, democratic processes act as safety valves: if one political party fails to fulfill the people’s expectations, another party can step up to the plate.

Having said all that, how should we see the recent protests in Tunisia and Egypt and the future of democracy in the Middle East? Some commentators remain skeptical – even cynical – about the likelihood of real political change coming to the region. Others seem cautiously optimistic, arguing that the protests may be the birth pangs of popular democracies in the Arab world.

Meanwhile, leaders in the region and around the world have interpreted the Tunisian and Egyptian protests to fit their own needs. Iranian officials have likened the protests to their Islamic Revolution, which is approaching its 32nd anniversary. The Iranian opposition, for its part, compares the events in Tunisia and Egypt to the protests that broke out in the aftermath of Iran’s controversial presidential elections in 2009. Juggling between his desire to protect a close U.S. ally, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and peaceful citizens demanding freedom and prosperity, U.S. President Barack Obama called upon the Egyptian government not to use force against the protestors.

Looking at this picture, we need to be realistic about the prospects of democratization in the Middle East. Current democracies in the region (Kuwait, Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, and Turkey) have too many problems to address. Lebanon and Iraq still cannot overcome sectarian factionalism. Israel, for its part, continues to disenfranchise the nearly 5 million Palestinians under occupation in the West Bank. And Turkey’s problems with respect to freedom of expression and freedom of the press are all too well-known.

None of this is to argue that there’s anything inherently undemocratic about Middle Eastern societies. But it is a fact that the struggle for democracy has been reversed in some Middle Eastern countries. Iran is a case in point. In others, such as Turkey, even after sixty years of free elections, democracy can still produce authoritarian governments without genuinely liberal alternatives.

Thus, the only thing we can do is to hope for the best for Tunisia, Egypt, and the Middle East while staying put for less-than-ideal scenarios.

Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. candidate in history at The University of Virginia. He welcomes all comments, questions, and exchanges. To contact him, click here.

You can also follow him on Twitter (@barinkayaoglu) and Facebook (BarınKayaoğlu.com).

Share

The Crazy (and Naïve) Oracle: Some Wishful Thinking for 2011

By BARIN KAYAOĞLU

January 7, 2011

A favorite story that I like to tell my students goes as follows:

One day in 1928, friends of the smartest man in Munich asked him to predict the city’s future. “In 1933,” the man starts, “the city, like the rest of the country, is run by the thugs who had tried to carry out a coup five years ago.” His friends are not impressed. “But ten years later,” the man continues optimistically, “Munich will be the leading cultural and commercial center of the German Empire stretching from the North Pole to North Africa.” Joyful, his friends ask him to say more. “Five years later, however, Munich, together with the rest of Germany, will lie in ruins.” The comment displeases his audience.

“Oh, don’t look so depressed,” the man goes on, “by 1953, we would have rebuilt Munich with American aid, and, by 1963, more than half of Munich residents will be so well-off that they’ll own boxes that show movies and pictures like in the cinemas.” His friends, bewildered, then hear the most shocking bit: “Look, we’ll end up having so many jobs in Munich by 1963 that we’ll have to bring in hundreds of thousands of workers from other countries to maintain our prosperity.”

The man’s friends, of course, lock him up in a lunatic asylum, even though events would prove him correct.

In the same spirit as the crazy wise man, here are my predictions for 2011:

–          The international community finally understands the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan and shifts its attention to rebuilding the two countries’ socioeconomic infrastructure with long-term project and not “quick impact” ideasthat are of little use. Building schools, hospitals, dams and roads seems to cost a lot less than guns and bullets.

–          Realizing that its own well-being can only go hand-in-hand with its neighbors’ security, the Pakistani government shows greater resolve to curtail insurgent activity on the Afghan border. The security situation in both countries shows marked improvement.

–          The Iranian government and the P5+1 group start making real progress on the nuclear question. Iran grants the IAEA full access to all of its nuclear facilities; the UN Security Council begins lifting the sanctions. American and Iranian diplomats lay the groundwork for a direct meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi. Re-establishing diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran seems on the horizon.

–          Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu finally ends the coalition with the far-right Avigdor Lieberman and forms a new coalition with the centrist Kadima. Netanyahu’s move convinces Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas to restart direct talks. Both parties show unprecedented flexibility with respect to sensitive issues: Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, and the return of Palestinian refugees. Progress with the Palestinians encourages the Israeli government to renew peace talks with Syria.

–          The last U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq as scheduled. With American forces out, the Obama administration can allocate more resources for economic recovery and reduces the federal deficit. The U.S. economy finally starts to improve, followed by the rest of the world. Republicans and Democrats in Congress begin to address some of America’s most pressing problems, much to everyone’s surprise.

–          In Turkey, the PKK declares a permanent ceasefire against Turkey and agrees to turn over its arms to the United Nations. In turn, the AKP government, with support from CHP, passes a law giving full amnesty to the organization’s rank-and-file and conditional amnesty to high-ranking officials in Northern Iraq. With the violence coming to an end in Southeast Turkey, democratic standards improve and the region’s economy begins to boom.

–          North and South Korea tone down their rhetoric and mutually suspend all military exercises. The North Korean leadership, aware of their country’s despondent situation, begins talks with its southern brothers to end the country’s now-58-year-old division.

(Other actual and potential conflict zones can be added to this list with similar “predictions”: Bosnia-Herzegovina; China-Taiwan; Congo; the Ivory Coast; Kosovo; Northern Mexico; Sudan.)

Do such predictions make me sound crazy? Of course they do.

But if you’re going to lock me up like the man from Munich, bear in mind that if a good deal of these prophecies do not work out, not many of us will survive to tell me that I was wrong.

Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. candidate in history at The University of Virginia. He welcomes all comments, questions, and exchanges. To contact him, click here.

You can also follow him on Twitter (@barinkayaoglu) and Facebook (BarınKayaoğlu.com). 

Share