Tag Archives: democracy

Why Turkey’s Elections May Not Matter


30 March 2014

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Today, 52 million Turks cast their votes in local elections. Although the vote won’t affect the parliamentary majority of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), the elections are perceived to be a popularity contest for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is mired in a major corruption scandal. Social media users have reported that they’ve never seen such long lines at polling stations. It is expected that these elections will witness the highest participation rates in any election in Turkish history. It seems like Turkey has a chance to change.

Supporters of Erdogan at an election rally, July 2007 (Photo by Ramdam / Wikimedia Commons)
Supporters of Prime Minister Erdogan at an election rally, July 2007 (Photo by Ramdam / Wikimedia Commons)

Some observers, including Al-Monitor columnist Mustafa Akyol, argue that Turkey’s local elections matter because they will act as a predictor for this summer’s presidential election in which Prime Minister Erdogan is expected to run. Today’s vote, observers say, will also help to predict the parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2015 (but may be held at the same time as the presidential election).

But several reasons might make today’s local elections and voting in general an irrelevant practice in the Turkish political context…

[To read the rest of the post, click here.]

Barın Kayaoğlu is finishing his doctorate in history at the University of Virginia. He was recently a Smith Richardson Foundation fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University. You can follow him on Twitter (@barinkayaoglu) and Facebook (Barın Kayaoğlu).


How Turkey Misinterprets Ergenekon


7 August 2013

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Yesterday’s verdicts in the Ergenekon case proved once again that Turkish society still has a long way to go before it develops a culture of democracy and rule of law.

According to the prosecution, the Ergenekon network was the very essence of Turkey’s “deep state” – carrying out assassinations and false flag operations in order to overthrow democratically-elected governments. Prosecutors contended that Ergenekon operatives even plotted a coup against Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from 2004 through 2007. Dozens of nationalist officers, policemen, academics, and journalists were sentenced to lengthy prison terms.

The case was a great opportunity for Turkey to put an end to its problematic tradition of military supremacy in politics. But allegations of trumped-up evidence, lengthy detentions, lack of societal consensus over the verdict, and, most importantly, the possibility that Ergenekon may not even be finished raise a very dangerous specter for Turkey.

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Egypt’s Coup: In Order to Save Democracy, They Had to Destroy It


5 July 2013

The title sums up Egypt’s predicament. The country’s young democracy, like its counterparts elsewhere, had gotten off to a rocky start. A new constitution, formed by a Salafi- and Muslim Brotherhood-dominated assembly, alienated the country’s women, Christian minorities, and progressive youth. President Mohammad Morsi, who had been elected with barely 51 percent of the votes in last year’s elections, took his rule as a mandate to do whatever he wanted. Mr. Morsi turned to authoritarian methods to push his religious agenda. Economic conditions deteriorated, mass protests broke out.

Last Monday, 1 July, Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, General Abdul Fatah al-Sisi, issued a statement warning the opposition and President Morsi to resolve their differences. When the political actors failed, General Sisi moved his forces, removed Mr. Morsi from office, and installed Adly Mansour, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as interim president.

The coup reflected the textbook logic of any military takeover in an unstable democracy: in order to save democracy, the Egyptian military had to destroy it.

What happens now? Unfortunately, neither Egypt’s own history nor examples from other Middle Eastern countries are reassuring. Egypt had experienced a coup in 1952. The coup’s strongman, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, promised to lead the country to development and democracy. Soon, however, Nasser decided that he could not bring both wealth and democracy to his land so he forsake the latter to achieve the former (with immense popular support, it must be said). Anwar Sadat, who succeeded Nasser in 1970, was much less committed to Nasser’s socialism. Nevertheless, he held on to Nasser-like authoritarianism. Mobarak, a very different man than both Nasser and Sadat, also ran his country in an autocratic fashion.

The act of voting hasn't turned Egypt's dreams of democracy into a reality.
The act of voting hasn’t turned Egypt’s dreams of democracy into a reality.

Other Middle Eastern countries shared a similar fate. Turkey had four coups in the second half of the twentieth century (and almost had another one in 2007-8). Last month’s mass protests revealed how Turkish democracy is still an incomplete project. The 1970 coup in Syria brought the Assad dynasty to power. Iraq’s multiple coups from 1958 through the late 1960s enabled the rise of Saddam Hussein.

The greatest problem with coups is that they weaken the institutions – especially a free media and parliament – that could balance acrimonies among different segments of society. Egypt is already witnessing this dangerous dynamic. Conspiracy theories are afoot: the Muslim Brotherhood claims that the interim president, Adly Mansour, is secretly Jewish while Mr. Morsi’s supporters are digging in for a long fight.

Now, Egypt’s military faces an enormous task: it has to draft a constitution and build the political institutions that would balance the demands and expectations of all Egyptians – be they Muslim, Christian, secular, male, female, traditional, or Western-oriented. Otherwise, in a few years it could easily find itself in a position where it would have to save democracy by destroying it again.

Barın Kayaoğlu, a Smith Richardson Foundation fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University, is finishing his Ph.D. in history at the University of Virginia. He welcomes all comments, questions, and exchanges. To contact him, click here.

You can also follow him on Twitter (@barinkayaoglu), and Facebook (BarınKayaoğlu.com).


Turkish PM Erdogan’s Conspiracy Theories Contain a Paradox

[Guest column for Al-Monitor]


18 June 2013

If we are to believe Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the culprits for the mass protests that have rocked his country for over two weeks are “the interest rate lobby,” foreign hands,” and their domestic “collaborators.” Some of his supporters have even better ones: the intelligence agents of Britain, France, Iran, Israel, Russia, Syria, and the United States.

How spies from such a diverse group of countries agreed to, and succeeded in, destabilizing Turkey so easily and so quickly, we do not know.

But Prime Minister Erdoğan’s turn to conspiracy theories bears a strange paradox: since he came to power over ten years ago, his top priority has been to improve relations with both global investors and foreign nations. 

To continue reading, click here.


The Turkish Protests and Prime Minister Erdoğan’s Plan


13 June 2013

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Intentionally Pouring Fuel Over Fire

Since a small sit-in in Istanbul turned into mass protests throughout Turkey two weeks ago, many commentators have criticized Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s inflammatory rhetoric against the demonstrators. But unlike what observers think, the Turkish prime minister is not increasing tensions – calling the protestors “looters” and organizing flash rallies where he threatens to unleash his supporters because he is desperate or because he is blinded by rage or because he has lost touch with reality. Although Mr. Erdoğan seems like he’s unwittingly pouring fuel over fire, everything he does is meant to serve a political objective.

That objective is Çankaya, the district in the capital Ankara where Turkish presidents reside. The term of the current president, Abdullah Gül, ends next year. It is no secret that Mr. Erdoğan wants to expand the powers of the presidency and succeed Mr. Gül as president.

But how does Mr. Erdoğan’s inflammatory rhetoric serve his aspirations? Although the prime minister has been saying offensive things for a long time, it was around 2007-2008 that he began to use a more divisive discourse. In April 2007, the Turkish military, unwilling to see Mr. Gül become president because his wife wears the Islamic headscarf, issued a memorandum on its website threatening to overthrow the Erdoğan government (Mr. Gül was foreign minister at the time). Had the military succeeded, it would have been the fifth coup in republican Turkey. The episode coincided with the “republican rallies” (Cumhuriyet mitingleri) against Mr. Gül’s candidacy. Then, the country’s secular establishment fought another battle against Mr. Erdoğan’s AKP (Justice and Development Party) by threatening to close down the party at the Constitutional Court.

In this context, Prime Minister Erdoğan learned a simple lesson: he would not be able to appeal to diverse segments of Turkish society anymore. As a result, he came to rely on more conservative social groups who shared his worldview. In other words, Mr. Erdoğan began to pursue his agenda not through pluralism but through establishing majorities with those conservatives who would not otherwise vote for an AKP with a diverse social base. That’s precisely why the prime minister is still making assertions about the protestors that are proven to be false: that they “attacked the police” and “drank beer inside a mosque.” These allegations are sure to galvanize not only AKP supporters but also the country’s religious and nationalist majority. The prime minister is aware that popular anger against the protestors would turn into votes for him in next year’s presidential election.

Burning Turkey for Çankaya

Mr. Erdoğan, however, faces a dilemma: his tactic in escalating tensions, which served him quite well until now, could backfire. If the protests, which have remained generally non-violent so far (except for instances of police brutality), get out of control, the prime minister’s chances in the presidential election could be jeopardized. After all, Mr. Erdoğan would not be able to capitalize on his image of “man of order and economic growth” if Turkey experiences large-scale violence.

Here’s why: because the presidential election will be contested in a popular vote for the first time in Turkish history, Mr. Erdoğan’s electoral strategy would be to take more than 50 percent of the votes in the first round. A second round, which would pit Mr. Erdoğan against another popular candidate, would be too risky. If the opposition parties CHP and MHP do not nominate an ideological, combative, and divisive candidate but someone who could appeal to broad segments of society (a popular bureaucrat, artist, or even a retired general who does not have the “coup-maker” stain), it is possible that voters could choose such a candidate over Mr. Erdoğan. In that respect, it is also sensible for CHP and MHP to nominate President Gül, who is eligible for reelection and is more widely respected than the prime minister.

The Turkish PM needs to stop and think.
The Turkish PM needs to stop and think.

At this point, Prime Minister Erdoğan has to ask himself these two questions: is Turkey worth burning for the sake of Çankaya? More important, would a burnt Turkey award him with Çankaya?

Barın Kayaoğlu is finishing his Ph.D. in history at the University of Virginia and is a Smith Richardson Foundation fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University. He welcomes all comments, questions, and exchanges. To contact him, click here.

You can also follow him on Twitter (@barinkayaoglu), and Facebook (BarınKayaoğlu.com).